Still ‘Regime Competition’? Trade Unions and Multinational Restructuring in Europe by Pulignano, Valeria
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Still ‘Regime Competition’? Trade Unions and Multinational Restructuring in Europe"
 
Valeria Pulignano
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 61, n° 4, 2006, p. 615-638.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/014763ar
DOI: 10.7202/014763ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 9 février 2017 05:14
© RI/IR, 2006, vol. 61, no 4 — ISSN 0034-379X 615
Still ‘Regime Competition’?
Trade Unions and Multinational Restructuring 
in Europe
VALERIA PULIGNANO1
This article studies trade unions’ response to transnational 
change in a large multinational corporation within the motor 
industry in Europe. We show how the use of the European Works 
Councils (EWCs) as a forum for European negotiation did not 
counter the management’s effort to whipsaw trade unions, such as 
to play off workers against each other in local negotiations. This 
seems to suggest that the effort to network and coordinate between 
employee representatives, and to negotiate with management 
through ‘active’ EWCs is ineffective at controlling inter-union 
competition in cases of transnational restructuring. Hence, 
research outcomes illustrate that an analysis of the impact of 
European-level agreements on plant level is requested in order to 
assess the effectiveness of ‘active’ EWCs in forging cross-national 
links.
Trade unions are currently experiencing a growing disadvantage in 
coping with the international products market. Transnational political and 
economic integration have turned out to be the innovative challenges facing 
labour in the last decades. Pressures towards economic integration have 
been particularly greatest within groups of countries pursuing a common 
policy of regional integration. Accordingly, multinational companies are 
able to integrate production, distribution and marketing across diverse 
territories by taking advantage of socio-economic and political geographical 
differences.
– PULIGNANO, V., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium and associate fellow, University 
of Warwick, UK, valeria.pulignano@soc.kuleuven.be
– The paper draws from a ETUI-REHS research project on “Trade Unions Anticipating and 
Managing Change in Europe” funded by Art. 6 Innovative Measures – European Social 
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This is particularly evident if we look at the current restructuring 
activity of multinationals. They are engaged in new investments in different 
regions and localities, while searching to maintain competitiveness by 
reducing costs and improving performance. Specifically, more intense 
international competition is placing pressure on both wage and non-wage 
costs and it creates the conditions in which social dumping and relocation to 
countries outside (and within) Europe become a potential threat (Marginson, 
2006). More importantly, an implicit threat to relocate is bound up with 
the “coercive comparisons” of labour costs and performance across sites 
and countries (Coller, 1996). Poorly performing sites are threatened to 
receive low investments as the effects of relocating production activities 
to better performing sites in other countries or regions. These comparisons 
are deployed by management to place pressure on local workforces and 
trade unions. Specifically, the ability of trade unions to respond to the 
process of transnational corporate restructuring is weakened because of
the playing off multinational capital generates between workers within more 
regulated labour market economies, with traditionally high labour costs and 
rigid working conditions on one hand, and those in less regulated labour 
markets with more flexible working conditions on the other. This generates 
“competitive whipsawing” (Katz, 1985; Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986) 
in accordance to which trade unions are threatened to concede flexibility and 
cost cutting in return for job protection in one location against another.
Ulman (1975) argued that historically, as markets expanded, trade 
unions had to enlarge their strategic domains to keep workers from being 
played off against each other, undermining wage and labour standards. In 
Europe, this practice became widespread in the 1990s with the programme 
of European integration and the implementation of the European economic 
and monetary union (EMU). Literature reflected on the extent to which 
European integration may give trade unions strong reasons to develop 
European wide capacities due to the higher level of regulation in comparison 
to the rest of the global economy. In particular, strong attention has been 
focused on significant institutional innovation in European-level company-
based industrial relations, such as the establishment of European Works 
Councils (EWCs) as the result of the EU’s 1994 EWCs Directive.
Studies on EWCs have investigated the factors that influence the 
outcomes of cross-border management decision-making. Specifically, 
research highlights ‘agency’ (Lecher et al., 2001) and ‘structure’ (Marginson 
et al., 2004) as relevant elements, which are able to create ‘active’ EWCs 
by enhancing their influence on management decision-making in cases of 
multinational restructuring. By drawing from this theoretical framework, 
the paper pursues the objective to understand and to assess the ability of 
‘active’ EWCs to develop wide capacities for the European trade union 
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movement. This is pursued by examining the capacity of ‘active’ EWCs 
to stop employer whipsawing of local unions in the case of cross-border 
restructuring as well as to analyse the conditions (or lack of) associated 
with it. This empirical research offers many contributions. In particular, it 
illustrates that, although structural and agency factors affect the capacity 
of employee representatives within EWCs to influence the outcome of 
transnational management decision-making, the handling of the process 
of restructuring is strongly affected by the strategic capacity of the local 
union to control competition over wages and working conditions across-
borders. In other words, networking, coordination and consultation activities 
between employee representatives within EWCs, or with management, 
which generate negotiation of European-level agreements, seem ineffective 
at controlling or preventing inter-union competition in cases of transnational 
restructuring. Thus, European-level structures demonstrate to apparently 
have little effect on plant level settlements. In most respects, this can be 
explained through the fact that EWCs have not formally gained collective 
bargaining capacity at company-level, which is currently left in the local 
management and employee representatives’ hands. This implies that 
European negotiations—when they take place in the form of the European 
framework agreement by the EWC—are ‘voluntary’, and without formally 
coordinated trade unions influence at the European level. Thus, trade 
unions still have to act in national arenas, where the formal negotiation 
process takes place, and where differences in the bargaining structures, 
labour market policies and union traditions usually reflect diversity in 
union strategies and local union interests. This contributes to creating a 
context where “competitive whipsawing” is facilitated and the pressure by 
management for “concession bargaining” is reinforced.
We will evaluate this argument by reference to the case of transnational 
restructuring of General Motors (GM) in Europe in 2004. The paper begins 
with a brief discussion of the theoretical issues. We then introduce the case 
study and we illustrate the European metalworkers’ union approach towards 
the GM plan of restructuring, such as using the EWC to stop “plant closure.” 
Finally, we examine how and why, in spite of the reduction of the challenge 
to plant closure, this approach meant no elimination of management’s 
attempt to whipsaw union across borders in local negotiations.
THE METHODOLOGY
This article is based on a case study research on GM in Europe. Data 
for the case study were collected by using primary and secondary sources: 
25 semi-structured interviews with European and local level union officers 
in the plants under investigation, and employee representatives as members 
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of the EWC were developed. Analysis of update European and local union 
policy papers have been also used for data collection. Documentary data 
on company restructuring and management-labour relations, and copies of 
national collective agreements were collected at the workplace. The use of 
the case study method strongly supports the research aims and objectives, 
such as to better understand and assess the impact of ‘active’ EWC practices, 
which generate the European-level new regulatory framework, on plant 
settlements and to explain the conditions accompanying the use of such 
practices. Despite the constraints in terms of the difficulty of drawing 
analytical generalizations, case study analysis greatly increases our ability to 
examine the impact of ‘active’ EWCs on plant level regulation. This means 
to examine the extent to which local unions can use ‘active’ EWC to reduce 
whipsawing by management. Secondary sources were also used to collect 
supplementary data. These are the European Observatory of Industrial 
Relations (EIRO), the European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR) and 
the European Monitoring Centre for Change (EMCC).
INTERNATIONAL MARKET COMPETITION AND CROSS-
NATIONAL REGULATION: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
The last twenty years have seen a greatly increased transnationalization of 
economic, political, social and cultural relations. By detaching from the golden 
era of capitalism, which was primarily national in character and developed 
under the new international division of labour (Schoenberger, 1989), the new 
era of globalization sets the scene for the emergence of international markets. 
This is seen as part of the increased importance of multinational companies 
and international trade. Specifically, multinational enterprises are considered 
the genuine movers in the transnational markets. They provide economic 
coordination for development on a world scale by restructuring their activities 
while operating as transfers of resources and production from one country, 
sector or market to the other in order to maximize their profit.
In particular, multinational enterprises are at the forefront of a segmented 
production process that sequences stages of manufacturing in different 
national and/or regional territories by potentially contributing to generating 
“social dumping.” Generally speaking, the extent to which multinationals 
have to start with nationally embedded differences depends on the growing 
ability they have to move across borders by establishing inter-linkages 
between diverse domestic economies. As a result, the latter become 
increasingly interdependent and they offer scope to achieve the highest level 
of profit in more beneficial geographical areas versus less advantageous 
territories. Restructuring in the form of relocation of resources driven by 
market pressures forces worker and government competition in so far as it 
5 Pulignano-pages 615.indd 618     2007-02-08 12:33:52   
619STILL ‘REGIME COMPETITION’?
takes advantage of the diverse regional social and labour conditions. The 
implications for labour are that the bargaining power of workers and unions 
is undermined because of the erosion of the material base of traditional re-
distributive solidarity in the welfare states (Streeck, 1999).
Trade unions, and particularly those from the most economically 
advantaged countries and more regulated economies, are fearful of the 
increased international competition. They worry that capital mobility 
entails further competition between countries, and trade unions across 
countries, on the basis of differences in labour standards. The relocation 
of production units to lower wage countries stimulates a downwards spiral 
of labour standards with a wave of concession agreements as the way 
for national unions to secure jobs. Katz, Lee and Lee (2004) argue that 
local unions seem to be willing to grant concessions employers desire on 
restructuring since they feel more direct pressure from workers threatened 
by employment losses.
In Europe, the creation of the EMU has generated a debate about the 
prospect for a regional (European) system of industrial relations (Streeck, 
1998; Marginson and Sisson, 2004). At the base of such an assumption 
is the search for cross-border coordinated strategies of social regulation, 
which are able to manage the widespread restructuring and rationalization 
of industry that the single market is expected to trigger (Marginson and 
Schulter, 1999). An example of cross-border regulation is the EWC directive 
94/45/EU. It aims at establishing in community and scale companies, 
information and consultation rights for employees’ representatives from 
the countries of the European Economic Area (EEA). A debate here has 
been generated in the literature, which focuses on the problem of creating 
cross-border employee representative arrangements, mostly due to the 
diversity of regulation in different national industrial relations systems, 
and the union fear of feeling ultimately threatened by wage sharing on 
one hand (Marginson and Schulter, 1999). On the other hand, the national 
and company-level trade unions’ willingness to preserve their sphere of 
autonomy in regulating labour issues while establishing linkage with the 
European level, have also been considered to influence the extent to which 
collective representative coordination within EWCs is achieved within the 
context of European integration. Hence, the practice of EWCs and their 
influence is illustrated to vary considerably. EWCs range from ‘symbolic’ 
EWCs, involving a low level of information provision and no formal 
consultation, and little or no contact between employee representatives, or 
with management, whose role is largely confined to a ritual annual meeting, 
through more ‘active’ bodies involving ongoing networking activity on the 
employee side and regular liaison with management, to those that exert a 
measure of influence over management decision-making and even engage 
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in negotiation of joint texts or framework agreements with the company 
(Hall and Marginson, 2005).
In terms of identifying the conditions that facilitate the emergence 
of an ‘active’ rather than a ‘symbolic’ EWC, Lecher and Rub (1999) and 
Lecher et al. (2001) take an ‘actor-centred’ approach, which emphasizes 
the organizational capacity of, and effective networking between the 
employee representatives, the strong links between the EWC representatives 
and those at national and local levels, the close relations with the trade 
unions providing resources and expert assistance as well as co-operative, 
high trust relations with central management as important factors in 
explaining variations in EWC capacity to act on one hand. On the other 
hand, structural factors, in particular the degree of internationalization and 
integration of the business operations of the companies concerned, are also 
considered crucial elements in affecting the capacity of EWCs to influence 
the outcome of transnational management decision-making (Marginson et 
al., 2004). Specifically, management structure and management policy are 
considered important. It is illustrated that how far EWCs are ‘active’ rather 
than ‘symbolic’ depends on whether there is a European level management 
structure. Moreover, EWCs are more likely to exercise influence where 
management’s approach to the EWC is proactive, seeing it as a mechanism 
that can be utilized for management purposes, such as improving 
management understanding of the rationale for business decisions and hence 
the legitimacy of management actions. The nature of pre-existing structures 
of employee representations is also important in facilitating the development 
of employee-side organization and activity. In particular, the reference here 
is to the existence of representative structures at national group level in the 
main countries of operation and/or a pre-existing international network 
among employee representatives on which the EWC can build. Finally, 
it is reported that the existence of all these factors facilitate EWCs ability 
to exercise a strong influence on management decision-making, engaging 
both in formalized consultation and in the negotiation of European-level 
agreements with central management on the handling of transnational 
restructuring (Hall and Marginson, 2005). This is supported by a recent 
study of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (2004), which illustrates that the capacity of EWCs to 
effectively influence decision making in multinationals seems to be often 
directly linked with the possibility to affect the dynamics of restructuring 
in those companies. Accordingly, joint agreements have been negotiated by 
the ‘active’ EWC to handle aspects of European-wide restructuring.1
1. In Ford, General Electric and General Motors EWCs have served as a forum for 
negotiations between management and employee representatives in case of restructuring 
(European Works Councils Bulletin, 56, 2005). 
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In this paper, we argue that a further examination of the impact of 
European-level agreements on plant level should support the analysis on the 
EWC practices. As the next paragraphs illustrate, in the case of GM Europe 
the European-level framework agreement which was negotiated between 
the European Employee Forum (EEF)—which was set up in 1996 as one 
of the most ‘active’ EWCs negotiating on issues related to cross-border 
restructuring—and the central management did not eliminate the scope for 
management to use “regime competition” to whipsaw trade unions.
GM AND THE 2004 PLAN FOR CROSS-NATIONAL 
RESTRUCTURING IN EUROPE
GM is one of the world’s largest automotive groups with headquarter 
in the United States. In Europe, GM opened its first assembly plant in 
Denmark in 1923, and one year later in Belgium, in Antwerp. The group 
acquired Vauxhall Motors in Luton, in Britain, in 1925 and the Adam 
Opel AG in Russelshëim in Germany in 1929. Amongst the most recent 
developments in Europe, in 2000 GM Europe took full ownership of 
the Saab Company in Trollhättan in Sweden, following a joint venture 
agreement between Saab-Scania AB and GM. This followed the setting 
up of the new European GM group headquarters in Zurich in 1986, which 
signed the automotive corporation moving towards greater centralization 
of its operations in Europe.
The management approach followed by GM in Europe has been very 
much keen to emphasize organizational change in the direction of increased 
flexibility coupled with cost-cutting as the way to increase competitiveness 
under a regime of lower costs and lower priced goods. Accordingly, 
manufacturing in Europe has been organized in ‘platforms’ for different 
models as the way to increase the company’s flexibility by exchanging 
models, and production volumes within the same platform from one plant 
to the other. Moreover, the organizational change implied a shift to cross-
national and cross-company alliances and cooperation with other potential 
competitors, such as the attempt to create a joint venture with Fiat in 2000. 
Table 1 indicates the distribution of GM plants, employees, car models, 
platforms and vehicles produced in Europe in 2004-2005.
Since the mid-1990s, restructuring has been a key issue in GM in 
Europe. Central management explained the restructuring plan as the result of 
the crisis which affected the US-based automaker. Company data illustrate 
a steep reduction of the market share within the GM group (including 
Opel/Vauxhall, Saab, Chevrolet and others) with a loss of around 5% from 
1994 to 2004 in comparison with the other auto makers in Europe (e.g., 
Volkswagen, Peugeot, Japan makers). Excluding Fiat, Renault and Rover, 
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there has been a slight increase between 1 and 3% in sales and revenues 
for the remaining automakers in Europe. Data for GM in 2005 illustrate 
an increase of only 1% in the volume of production due to the sales for 
Chevrolet (see table 2).
TABLE 1
GM Plants, Employees, Car Models per Platform and Production in Europe 
and Russia (2004-2005)
Country Plant Employees Car Models(platform)
2004
(x 1000)
2005
(x 1000)
Belgium Antwerp 5,300 Astra (Delta) 231.6 253.1
Germany Bochum 9,700 Astra (Delta) 059.8 071.3
Zafira (Delta) 183.9 172.6
Eisenbach 1,900 Corsa (Gamma) 144.9 115.2
Russelshëim 6,700 Vectra (Epsilon) 146.0 144.8
Signum (Epsilon) 018.5 016.5
Poland Gliwice 1,800 Agila (Delta) 034.2
Suzuki Wagon (Delta) 002.9
Astra Classic (Delta) 063.1
Zafira (Delta) 028.3
TOTAL 116.6 128.8
Portugal Azambuja 1,200 Combo (Gamma) 066.4 073.8
Russia Togliatti Chevrolet Niva 054.0 049.7
Chevrolet Viva 000.2 0v2.1
TOTAL 054.2 051.8
Spain Zaragoza 8,400 Corsa/Corsavan 
(Gamma)
225.7 204.4
Meriva (Gamma) 195.9 181.9
TOTAL 421.6 386.3
Sweden Trollhättan 6,600 Saab 9-3 (Epsilon) 064.5 074.2
Saab 9-5 (Epsilon) 037.5 029.1
Cadillac BLS 000.1
TOTAL 102.0 103.4
Britain Ellesmere Port 4,000 Astra (Delta) 102.1 188.8
Vectra (Delta) 027.8
Luton 1,600 Vivaro (Delta) 053.0 058.5
Renault Trafic (Delta) 036.0 031.9
TOTAL VEHICLES 1,782,200 1,796,700
Source: ACV-Metaal; EMF (2005).
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TABLE 2
Market Share (%) per Automaker Groups in Europe
Group 1994 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BMW 03.3 03.2 02.9 03.7 04.3 04.3 04.5 04.5
Daimler
Chrysler
03.5 05.5 06.2 06.4 06.6 06.6 06.2 06.2
Fiat 10.8 09.4 10.0 09.6 08.2 08.2 07.6 06.6
Ford 13.4 11.0 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.4 11.3 10.9
GM 13.1 11.9 10.8 10.8 09.9 09.9 09.6 10.5
Japanise Makers 10.9 11.3 11.4 10.4 11.5 11.5 13.3 13.5
PSA 12.8 11.9 13.1 14.4 15.0 15.0 14.5 13.7
Renault 11.0 10.8 10.6 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.2 10.2
Rover 03.2 02.0 01.3 01.1 01.0 01.0 00.8 00.3
Volkswagen 16.0 18.5 18.7 18.9 18.4 18.4 17.7 18.9
Korean Makers 00.0 02.5 03.4 02.8 02.7 02.7 04.0 03.9
Source: ACV-Metaal; EMF (2005).
In a recent report, the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) 
identifies two specific reasons behind the economic crisis of GM Europe: 
the inconsistency of GM management strategies, and transformations in 
the European car manufacturing industry in recent years (EMF, 2005). In 
GM’s European operations, these financial difficulties led to important 
job cuts. Specifically, in a range of different restructuring efforts, GM cut 
about 21,000 jobs in Europe from 1998 to 2001. Amongst the workforce 
reductions, the one at Opel in 2000 led to the reduction of 6,000 jobs, 
of which 2,000 in Luton (Britain). In 2001 management announced that 
a further 10,000 jobs would be cut between Zaragoza (Spain), Bochum 
and Eisenach (Germany), and Antwerp (Belgium). Moreover, the alliance 
between GM and Fiat in 2000, followed by the outsourcing into two joint 
venture companies, risked to affect over 14,000 workers in GM and almost 
15,000 in Fiat in Europe and Brazil (EMF, 2005).
In early September 2004, GM announced through the media, without 
proper prior information and consultation of the EWC, that it would progress 
in cutting a further 12,000 jobs involving the three main brands GM owns 
in Europe, that is Opel, Saab and Vauxhall. According to management, this 
would lead to the closure of one entire plant with Germany or Sweden as 
the countries which would carry the heaviest burden.2 Specifically, at the 
beginning it was not clear from the GM’s announcement which site would 
have been primarily affected by the closure. As a result, a lot of pressure 
2. EMF Info Letter, “The EMF Approach to GM Restructuring,” 2005.
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was put on the employee representatives at the GM sites in Trollhättan 
(Sweden) (Saab) with around 6,000 employees, and Russelshëim (Opel) and 
Bochum in Germany with almost 17.000 workers in total. The Financial
Times commented: “General Motors has pitched the headquarters of its loss-
making German and Swedish units against each other in a competition to 
build the next generation of its mid-sized Opel and Saab cars” (Financial
Times, 3 September 2004). The announcement of job losses led to an 
unofficial strike at Bochum, which halted production in other plants, 
because the German plant is supplier to the Belgian and British GM plants 
(Bartmann, 2005).
The climate of pressure on employee representatives and trade unions 
is aptly captured by the description of Hakan Scott—union official at 
Trollhättan plant—of GM’s threat “to shift production of the Swedish plant’s 
main model, which at that time made up almost two-thirds of the 115,000 
cars built annually” (Financial Times, 3 September 2004). The scenario 
of “regime competition” which developed in GM and its implications for 
employment has been traditionally the focus of extended debate. Hancké 
(2000) provides a vivid description of the “coercive comparisons” deployed 
by GM management on its European operations in the late 1990s. The 
aim was to place pressure on local workforce, works councils and local 
unions, and through local negotiations to lever cost-reducing and flexibility 
concessions as the result of a round of concessions bargaining. In that 
period, the European Employee Forum (EEF) decided that there must be 
a European framework agreement as the basis for the different plant-level 
agreements in Europe. The first European agreement was signed in July 
2000 and the second in March 2001 (the so-called Olympia plan) and they 
both were accompanied by days of action at local and European levels. The 
intention was to prevent any plant closure and redundancies by creating 
“safety fences” (EIRO, 2001).
When in 2004 GM announced the intention to close a production plant 
for overcapacity in Europe, a European trade union coordination group was 
set up with participants from the EMF, representatives of the national trade 
unions concerned and members of the EWC. The trade union presence in the 
coordination group was crucial to support the EWC in the negotiation process 
with management and to ensure integrity and social cohesion to the group 
as well as strengthening cross-border workers’ solidarity. The European 
trade union coordination group agreed on common basic demands for a 
clear commitment by the local trade unions of no negotiations at national 
level but the obligation to demand for bargaining a European framework 
agreement to deal with the employment effects of restructuring. Moreover, 
the agreement would set up minimum standards regarding redeployment 
and social measures to adopt for the sites affected by restructuring. This 
5 Pulignano-pages 615.indd 624     2007-02-08 12:33:52   
625STILL ‘REGIME COMPETITION’?
demand follows the EMF approach regarding “social responsible company 
restructuring”3 with the need for international labour cooperation as a 
possible way to control competition over wages and working conditions. 
The aim is to narrow the scope for management to whipsaw local unions 
while generating a downward spiral of working conditions through putting 
pressure for concession bargaining.
The Copenhagen declaration, which was signed by the German 
(IGMetall) and the Swedish (Svenska Metall, SIF and CF) trade unions the 
1st of October 2004, manifested the unions’ rejection of any managements 
attempt to use the national-level industrial relations system to negotiate 
the outcomes of restructuring. By contrast, they expressed the interest 
to rely on the EWC as a critical institutional vehicle for this. The union 
leaders made clear that “plant closure, mass redundancies and violation of 
collective bargaining agreements do not contribute to regaining success” 
(“Copenhagen Declaration by trade union leaders from IGMetall, Svenska 
Metall, SIF, CF and EMF in respect of GM Europe restructuring,” FEM 
41/2004). Trade union leaders examined the devastating effects on 
employment of the national negotiations which were undertaken in 1997 
in Germany, and by mid-1998 in Spain, Belgium, and Britain. These cases 
were used to illustrate how the agreements in one country or plant affected 
the others, thus forcing all to negotiate similar concessions, and ultimately 
destroyed the initial advantages that individual unions had secured. In a 
public interview Franz Klaus—chair of the GM EWC—commented that 
“it was a mistake what German unions made in 1997, when they hit the 
unions in Antwerp and Luton with concessions on wages and working time 
flexibility” (May, 2005).
On the 14th of October, the European trade union coordination group 
organized a European action day against the GM closure decision, which 
involved the participation of over 50,000 employees in all GM plants 
across Europe. As a result, in December 2004 management representatives 
of GM Europe and the GM EEF signed a European framework agreement 
on restructuring and cost-cutting. The agreement aims to put into place 
a framework within which the restructuring at GM European facilities 
can be managed according to the EMF principles of “social responsible 
restructuring,” such as to minimize the social consequences of industrial 
change for employees and the wider community. As such, the framework 
agreement was seen as representing the trade unions’ common attempt to 
manage the downward pressure on wages by using the EWC as a strategic 
3. “Restructuring is not simply ignored or opposed as such but managed in accordance to 
correct criteria, which envisage negotiated solutions acceptable for both employees and 
management” (EMF, “EMF Policy Approach towards Socially Responsible Company 
Restructuring,” Luxemburg, 7-8 June, 2005: 4).
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tool to help keeping job security while soliciting cross-border trade union 
networking, coordination, and solidarity. The main point of the agreement 
is to resist “forced redundancies and plant closure.” Hence, Reinhard 
Kuhlmann—former EMF General Secretary—described the outcomes of 
the negotiation as the “victory of reason” (EMF newsletter 8 December 
2004).
As a result of the agreement, GM management agreed to keep the Opel 
Russelshëim plant open till 2010. It was also agreed no forced redundancies 
and no plant closure for the Saab Trollhättan plant. Generally speaking, the 
European-level agreement created a framework within which negotiations 
in Germany and Sweden as well as in the other countries affected by 
restructuring (i.e., Belgium, Britain and Spain) could take place. The 
agreement states that job security is guaranteed in return for early and 
partial retirement schemes as well as voluntary redundancy. Thus, a total of 
9,500 jobs will be cut through voluntary severance in Germany (including 
Russelsheim, Bochum and Kairserslautern), and 2,000 employees will 
be made voluntary redundant among the other GM’s Swedish, Belgian, 
Spanish, and British plants. Other measures indicated in the agreement as 
relevant to reduce overcapacity are the use of outsourcing, such as asking 
employees to go to work for future joint-ventures with Opel suppliers, and 
voluntary transfer. Accordingly, most of the jobs will be moved to so-called 
transfer agencies where employees can receive further training to facilitate 
their outplacement (EIRO, 2004). Paradoxically enough James Mackintosh 
reports that as a result of this operation GM Europe will be able to cut off 
almost 12,000 employees in Europe and save 500 Million Euro in total 
(Financial Times, 5 March 2005).
The European-level agreement followed the management decision to 
base production of the new Vectra and Saab model cars at the German 
rather than the Swedish plant. As the next paragraph will illustrate, the 
transfer of production to Opel Russelshëim coincided with a new wage and 
flexible working-time moderation deal with GM employees in Germany. 
This reflects the German union strategy, such as to prevent job cuts and 
forced redundancies by bargaining concessions and negotiating through the 
works councils better conditions than the minimum set by law for those 
who will leave the company. Moreover, this strategy is combined with 
the use of industrial action. Specifically, the strike at Bochum was used 
by the German unions to put pressure on management to bargain locally 
job guarantees in exchange for concessions on wages and flexibility. The 
cross-national diversity in trade union strategies generated a situation 
of inter-union competition. This is reflected in the different content and 
functions of the local agreements. Despite the ‘save fences’ created by 
the European framework agreement, bargaining was developed locally 
5 Pulignano-pages 615.indd 626     2007-02-08 12:33:52   
627STILL ‘REGIME COMPETITION’?
by unions and works councils in order to gain local advantages versus 
European objectives.
IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE
Though Opel Russelshëim in Germany and Saab Trollhättan in 
Sweden are the only plants where formal agreements securing employment 
and production location have been explicitly negotiated under the 2004 
European framework agreement, similar deals have been concluded in 
other plants in Germany as well as in other countries in response to the 
German and Swedish initiatives. Table 3 presents some features of these 
agreements with indication of the employment arrangements in the five 
main GM car-producing countries in Europe: Germany, Sweden, Britain, 
Spain, Belgium.
By setting up the rules for “no forced redundancy and no closure”, 
the framework agreement acted as an umbrella under which the above-
mentioned rules become binding for all follow-up agreements at plant level. 
On the other hand, formally the local agreements address the local interests 
and strategies trade unions and works councils developed to respond to the 
challenges of restructuring. These strategies reflect the different institutional 
situation, such as the bargaining structure and national labour market 
policies as well as the diverse union traditions in the context where the 
agreement was concluded. For example, the strategies of German works 
councils and trade unions reflect the existence of a national bargaining 
system, which is highly company-centred and where “employment security 
agreements” play a major role. Bartmann (2005) defines the employment 
security strategy pursued in Germany as a “two embankments strategy.” 
The first ‘embankment’ means that the conclusion of employment security 
agreements prevents job cuts in the short-term by reducing wages and 
increasing working-time flexibility. Specifically, works councils make 
concessions concerning wages at the company level, which implies the 
reduction of surplus payments in relation to the national or branch-level 
collective agreement. This can be explained by referring to the German 
‘dual’ system in accordance to which works councils are formally not 
involved in collective bargaining at company level, which is usually left 
at the branch level, but actually they massively deal locally with surplus 
payment. In return for the reduction in surplus payments and working-time 
flexibility, employers give a job security guarantee which means compulsory 
redundancies are foreclosed for a certain period. The second ‘embankment’ 
deals with long-term problems, such as huge overcapacities. In this case, 
compensation programmes, such as early retirement schemes and transfer 
agencies, are combined and should prevent forced redundancies. The 
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German agreement (Zukunftsvertrag), which was negotiated at GM with the 
local works council, follows the “two embankment strategy.” It indicates 
zero per cent wage increase for 2005 covering the workers at Russelshëim. 
After 2005, there will be a cut of 1% of the company’s premium pay 
negotiated in the national collective agreement. Conversely, the employees 
at Bochum, Kaiserslautern and Eisenach will suffer a zero per cent wage 
increase till 2010. Moreover, the agreement lowers the Christmas bonus for 
all the workers and increases the working-time up to 40 hours a week and 
15 extra days per year (including Saturday) at Bochum and Kairserslauter 
without increase in pay. The latter will be fixed at the normal hourly rates 
till 2010. In return, GM underwrites sites open in Germany until 2010 
and undertakes to make no compulsory redundancies by moving the mid-
range car models production to Russelshëim. Additionally, the agreement 
introduces social measures, such as employee mobility, outsourcing and 
retraining for those who are transferred to outsourced joint ventures.
The Swedish unions, in contrast, have traditionally rejected job 
guarantees. Instead, they implement a strategy aimed at securing 
employment opportunities for workers by improving the operation of the 
labour market. This strategy is boosted by the active labour market policies 
in Sweden, which aim at full employment. This is demonstrated by the 
relatively low unemployment rate (around 5%) and the wide opportunities 
offered by the Swedish labour market system for further training and re-
skilling. Thus, workers representatives in Sweden are much more likely 
than their German counterparts, to accept job cuts where there is surplus 
capacity. This is supported by a particular structure of the bargaining system 
in Sweden in accordance to which the decentralization process occurred 
after the 1980s, with the correspondent emergence of two bargaining levels 
(branch and company level), entailed to the formal shift of the competence 
for the unions to bargain payment locally under the requirements of the 
national collective agreement. Thus, Swedish works councils are not 
usually involved in concluding agreements on the reduction of the payments 
negotiated at the branch level. Active labour market policies and branch-
level centralized bargaining structure explain why Swedish unions did not 
use the strategy of wage reduction and flexible working time to prevent job 
cuts at the Swedish plants. Hence, management was clear in declaring its 
intention to keep open competition between Trollhättan and Russelshëeim 
by reducing the guarantee for job security at the Swedish in comparison 
to the German site. Local trade unions in Trollhättan negotiated no plant 
closure in 2005, with an initially vague promise by management it might 
be extended till 2008. This reflects the local union strategies to bargain 
social protection for the people involved in restructuring without lowering 
their working conditions in return for job guarantees. In an interview, Paul 
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Akerlund—chairman of the works council in the Trollhättan plant—states: 
“the aim of the Swedish local negotiation in GM restructuring was to save 
people and not jobs” (29 June 2005).
The Spanish and the British agreements are union responses to specific 
crisis, such as the drastic reduction of the labour force at Ellsemere Port 
and the cut off of 618 employees at Zaragoza in 2004. The different 
content of the agreements illustrates country-based diversity concerning 
bargaining structures and union traditions. In December 2004, the Spanish 
works councils negotiated job security for the employees at Zaragoza till 
September 2006. Job security was guaranteed by derogating the provisions 
of the pre-existing local agreement, in accordance to which the employer 
could unilaterally decide on employee dismissal in case of company 
restructuring. The derogation of these provisions avoided job cuts by 
allowing the people who were almost aged 60 to go on retirement. The local 
agreement is the combined effect of the articulated bargaining structure 
and the political tradition of Spanish unions. As Martinez Lucio (1998) 
reminds us, since the mid-1990s, the bargaining system in Spain explicitly 
defines the issues to be reserved to each level (i.e. inter-professional, 
branch, company level). Therefore, likewise in Sweden, Spanish works 
councils have formal competence to bargain at company level, pay rates 
and working time under the umbrella of the requirements indicated in the 
higher-level agreement. However, conversely to Sweden, trade unions in 
Spain used industrial action to accompany the bargaining process. In an 
interview, Jose Fernando Moya—member of the Spanish works council—
considers the Spanish local agreement as a “local success because of the 
mobilizing capacity demonstrated by the Spanish unions while negotiating 
no concessions on working time flexibility and wage reductions with 
management” (27 June, 2005). Conversely, the very deregulated nature 
characterizing plant-level bargaining in Britain, in accordance to which 
plant bargainers are constrained to operate within parameters determined 
by corporate management, weakened the unions and increased the scope for 
the employer to cut off more than 300 employees in Ellsemere Port, without 
recurring to bargain any form of job guarantees. In a deregulated industrial 
relations context and weak unionism, the European-framework agreement 
generated positive effects for employees. In an interview, Steve Hart—T&G 
union officer—argues that “despite we lost the argument to ask for voluntary 
redundancy and early or partial retirement, the framework agreement gave to 
us the scope to explore alternatives to the drastic solution to lay off people. 
Without a framework agreement, we would have expected restructuring to 
take place much quicker and without information. Perhaps we would have 
heard about it on the radio as happened in the case of Luton plant and it 
would have involved more forced redundancy” (27 June, 2005).
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Finally, the plant-level agreement in Belgium, in marked contrast to 
the other countries, was concluded within the frame of management’s 
intention to build up a new press shop in Antwerp, including the transfer 
of part of the production capacity from the Bochum plant. As a result, 
the Belgian local unions negotiated an increase in productivity and costs 
savings (for an equivalent of 30 Million Euro) in return for the guarantee 
of the company to invest in Belgium. The chair of the works councils in 
Antwerp—Rudy Kennes—in an interview states: “We have paid for the 
press-shop” (18 July 2005). Similar to the German works councils, the 
Belgian agreement offered concessions in return for further investments 
and job guarantees. It included the reduction of the speed of the production 
line (from 56 to 52 jobs per hour), the extension of the night shift from 7 to 
8 working hours and the enhancement of organizational flexibility through 
continuous improvement. The agreement also provides job guarantees for 
226 out of the 524 employees (60 out of 226 workers are aged below 26). 
The remaining 298 will go on retirement or will be transferred to other GM 
plants in Belgium. Because of the concessions to work on Saturday made 
by the German unions in Bochum, the creation of the new press-shop in 
Antwerp coincided with the transfer of part of the production of the new 
Astra from Antwerp to Bochum.
One may argue that as the result of the European framework agreement, 
the different local negotiations were undertaken with the respect of the 
guarantee of “no closure and no forced redundancy” for all the countries 
involved as the demonstration of a strong fate of union trust and solidarity 
across borders. On the other hand, the different content and functions of 
these agreements highlight also that there is still weak scope for transnational 
coordination. Specifically, the European framework agreement negotiated 
through the ‘active’ EWC in GM had little effect on controlling inter-union 
competition and on stopping the whipsawing. This is illustrated by the 
national trade unions’ aim to benchmark their respective local agreements 
across borders, rather than to integrate them in an effective coordinated 
effort. The study demonstrates that the different country-based bargaining 
structures and labour market policies complemented by a focus on the 
variety of national interests and traditions of the organizational actors 
(in particular the local unions) affected the union strategies to respond to 
restructuring.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the trade unions’ attempt to use the EWC as an 
‘active’ tool to influence the outcome of transnational restructuring in a large 
multinational corporation within the motor industry in Europe. Specifically, 
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this implies that the EWC will engage in negotiation of European-level 
agreements with central management on the handling of industrial change. 
Research on EWCs has suggested that variations in EWCs’ “capacity to act” 
should be associated with structural and agency elements. More importantly, 
these studies have argued that management structure and policy, the level 
of internationalization of the business operations of the firm, the existence 
of pre-existing structures of employee representation as well as close 
links between the EWC representatives and national and local unions, and 
networking between the EWC members are important in facilitating the 
development of employee-side organization and activity, which is found 
to have the greatest impact on management decision-making concerning 
multinational restructuring.
The results found in this study generally support the importance of these 
factors. GM is a highly internationalized firm, with operations spread across 
more than one country and with highly integrated production activities 
across European borders. Additionally, the European Employment Forum 
(i.e. EWC) was very active in developing a strong negotiating role, which 
was undertaken with the support of the trade union coordinating group in 
GM Europe. By drawing from past experience, the national trade unions 
and the EWC members drew up a joint text aimed at maintaining all current 
production sites in order to promote a “socially responsible restructuring,” 
without forced redundancies and plant closure. A joint Europe-wide 
industrial action supported the negotiation process.
Nevertheless, when we examine the impact of the European-level 
agreement on plant-level settlements, research findings illustrate that having 
developed “socially responsible” responses in accordance to requirements 
contained in the European negotiation does not automatically imply 
effective cross-border coordination in bargaining matters. Specifically, the 
EWC’s “capacity to act” is reduced. This is indicated by the weak effect 
the European-level agreement had on stopping whipsawing by management 
through the EWC links and networking. The different local negotiations 
which were concluded under the European framework agreement account 
for these difficulties. They reflect diversity as the result of the cross-national 
differences in bargaining structures and labour market policies as well as 
diverse union traditions. We noted this concurs to address different union 
strategies and local interests across borders. For example, in Germany, 
local negotiation resulted in considerable concessions over pay and working 
time in return for job security. This reflects the strategy of German works 
councils and trade unions, which is based on the capacity to negotiate 
employment security agreements with management at the local level. 
They also often use industrial action to guarantee the negotiation of the 
employment security agreements. Conversely, Swedish works councils 
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are supported by a branch-level bargaining structure, which lays down the 
framework of requirements for company-level bargaining. Thus, works 
councils in Sweden did not negotiate the reduction of surplus payment at 
local level. Moreover, strong in their active labour market policies, Swedish 
unions did not negotiate concessions on working time flexibility or wage 
reduction in return for a guarantee on job cuts on one hand, and they did 
not use strikes as a relevant tool to put pressure on management for job 
guarantees on the other hand. Likewise to the Swedish case, and in contrast 
to the British, the outcomes of the Spanish local agreement were influenced 
by the articulated nature characterizing the bargaining system. This was 
complemented by the conflictual approach followed by the Spanish unions 
who, conversely to the weak British ones, were able to use industrial conflict 
to bargain job guarantees without concessions on wages and flexibility. By 
contrast, local negotiation in the Belgian plant reflects the specific local 
unions’ interest to concede flexibility in return for the company’s promise 
to expand production capacity. The tradition of rather weak articulation 
characterizing the Belgian industrial relations system, in accordance to 
which it is at the branch level that industrial relations activities are mostly 
conducted, offered the scope for works councils to make further concessions 
at the local level as the result of their strategy. This is explained by a labour 
market in Belgium where labour costs, in particular in the automobile 
industry, are becoming relatively high in comparison to Germany because 
of the concessions developed by the German unions in the last years. Thus, 
Belgian unions are pushed to follow the German example of bargaining 
concessions to avoid job losses.
In summary, although the national unions claimed some success 
at bargaining through the European-level agreement as a way to keep 
their plants open, this was done through the creation of competitive 
concessionary local agreements. This illustrates that the European-level 
agreement negotiated through the intervention of an ‘active’ EWC as the 
demonstration of the inter-union cooperation across borders was not able to 
stop whipsawing. Hence, the results of this study indicate a need to move 
beyond a simple picture of a single, unidirectional relationship between 
company- and actor-based factors while explaining the EWC “capacity 
to act” in case of transnational restructuring by attempting to establish 
inter-union links. The EWC’s “capacity to act” will also depend on how 
and in what context it will be able to produce coordinated results. There 
are important differences between unions, industrial relations institutions 
and companies’ strategy across borders. Future research needs to explore 
these differences and integrate them into the study of the factors affecting 
the variety in EWC practices. More generally, this requires that research 
on EWCs should be accompanied by the study of the impact of top-down 
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European-level institutions and approaches with a focus on the bottom-
up effects produced by this impact. It is clear from this argument that, to 
what extent trade unions in Europe will be able to use EWCs as a tool to 
influence corporate decision-making will be the integrated product of these 
dynamics.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les syndicats et les restructurations dans les multinationales 
en Europe : la concurrence entre les régimes nationaux est-elle 
inévitable ?
Cet essai analyse la tentative des organisations syndicales de recourir 
aux comités d’entreprise européens (CEE) comme un instrument efficient 
en vue d’exercer un impact sur le résultat d’un processus de restructuration 
transnationale dans une multinationale de l’industrie de l’automobile en 
Europe. Plus particulièrement, il s’inspire d’une analyse de cas d’une 
restructuration transnationale au sein de General Motors-Europe (GM). 
L’objectif comporte deux volets. D’abord, il cherche à comprendre et à 
évaluer l’habileté des comités « actifs » (par exemple, ceux qui participent 
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à la négociation d’accords au niveau européen) à développer des moyens 
efficaces pour le mouvement syndical européen d’influencer la prise de 
décision managériale, tout en arrêtant la surenchère des employeurs auprès 
des syndicats locaux dans le cas d’une restructuration transfrontalière. La 
surenchère se présente habituellement comme une tentative de la direction 
d’opposer les travailleurs les uns aux autres dans des négociations locales. 
Ensuite, cet essai analyse les conditions liées à la capacité ou au manque 
de capacité des comités à contenir la surenchère syndicale.
La recherche révèle que les pratiques des comités et leur impact sur la 
prise de décision managériale varient fortement. L’éventail se présente de 
la manière suivante : à un bout du continuum, on retrouve des comités de 
nature « symbolique », impliquant un faible niveau d’information et aucune 
consultation formelle, peu ou pas de contact entre les représentants des 
salariés ou avec la direction, dont le rôle se limite alors largement à une 
rencontre rituelle annuelle; ensuite, on constate la présence d’organismes 
plus actifs impliquant une action de réseautage continue de la part des 
employés et une liaison régulière avec la direction. À la fin de ce continuum, 
on peut identifier ceux qui exercent une certaine influence sur la prise de 
décision managériale et même ceux qui s’engagent dans une négociation 
de textes conjoints tenant lieu d’accord-cadre avec l’entreprise. Plus 
précisément, on soutient que les variations dans la capacité d’agir des 
comités sont reliées à des éléments de structure (Marginson et autres, 2004) 
ou de représentation (Lecher et Rub, 1999; Lecher et autres, 2001). Au 
cours des dernières années, des études ont tenté de rattacher ces recherches 
au thème plus large de la coordination et du réseautage transfrontaliers des 
syndicats. Comme résultante, l’habileté des comités à aider les syndicats à 
exercer une influence sur la prise de décision des entreprises a été analysée 
en centrant l’attention sur leur capacité de créer des liens transnationaux.
Cette étude comprend donc deux volets : elle cherche à connaître les 
facteurs qui influencent la capacité des comités d’entreprise « actifs » 
d’exercer un impact sur les restructurations transfrontalières des entreprises 
et dans quelle mesure ces facteurs agissent, cela en coordonnant les 
stratégies des syndicats nationaux et les intérêts des syndicats locaux au 
passage d’une frontière à l’autre. Elle s’intéresse au cas de GM-Europe, 
où le Forum européen des travailleurs, qui a été mis sur pied en 1996 pour 
être connu comme l’un des plus actifs des comités en négociant sur des 
enjeux liés à une restructuration transfrontalière, négociait en 2004 un 
accord-cadre à l’échelle de l’Europe avec la direction centrale de GM, 
qui garantissait qu’on n’assisterait pas à des fermetures d’usine ou à des 
réductions forcées d’effectif excédentaire. Les conclusions de cette étude 
laisse croire que des facteurs d’ordre structurel ou de représentation ont eu 
un impact sur la capacité des représentants des salariés au sein des comités 
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d’exercer une influence sur la prise de décision managériale transnationale, 
cela par l’obtention d’une promesse de la part de l’entreprise qu’il n’y 
aurait pas de fermeture d’usine, ni de réduction forcée de personnel. 
Cependant, le maniement du processus de restructuration dépendait 
fortement de l’aptitude d’un syndicat local à contrôler la concurrence sur 
les salaires et les conditions de travail à travers les frontières. En d’autres 
termes, la négociation d’accords à l’échelle européenne avec la direction 
n’arrivait pas à contenir et à prévenir la concurrence intersyndicale dans 
le cas de restructuration transnationale. Ceci est illustré par la diversité 
des négociations locales qui étaient parachevées par les syndicats locaux 
et les comités d’entreprise dans les usines européennes impliquées dans 
le processus de restructuration. Alors, la structure à l’échelle européenne, 
qui prenait la forme d’un accord-cadre, montre qu’elle a apparemment peu 
d’effet sur les règlements à survenir au niveau d’une usine et également 
sur la capacité d’établir une coordination efficace transnationale des enjeux 
de négociation. En bref, l’effet consistait à faire des différents accords 
locaux des points de repère, au lieu d’intégrer ces enjeux dans un effort de 
coordination efficace.
Cet essai fournit une explication à la faible influence que l’accord à 
l’échelle européenne eût pu avoir sur le besoin d’arrêter la surenchère de la 
part de la direction par le truchement de ses liens avec les comités et par son 
fonctionnement en réseau. On soutient que cela est attribuable aux comités, 
qui n’ont pu développer une capacité de négociation collective formelle à 
l’échelle de l’entreprise, laquelle est habituellement laissée à la direction 
locale et dans les mains des représentants des salariés. Ceci implique 
que les négociations à l’échelle européenne, lorsqu’elles sont conduites 
à l’intérieur d’un accord-cadre européen par les conseils, prennent une 
allure facultative et se tiennent sans un impact formellement coordonné des 
syndicats à l’échelle européenne. Alors, les syndicats doivent encore exercer 
leur action à l’intérieur de la scène nationale, où se déroule le processus 
de négociation formelle et où les différences des structures de négociation, 
les politiques du marché du travail et les traditions syndicales reflètent la 
diversité des stratégies syndicales et des intérêts locaux. Ceci contribue 
à créer une situation où la surenchère due à la concurrence est facilitée 
et où la pression exercée par la direction en faveur d’une négociation de 
concession se trouve renforcée.
À la lumière de ces observations tirées de la recherche, il se dégage 
des pistes de réflexion et des trajectoires possibles pouvant servir à des 
travaux subséquents sur les comités d’entreprise en général. Elles portent 
sur la nécessité d’aller au-delà d’un cas unique et simple, celui d’un rapport 
unidirectionnel entre une direction d’entreprise et un partenaire, au moment 
où l’on propose d’expliquer la capacité des comités à agir de façon efficace 
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dans les cas de restructuration transnationale. Comme l’illustre cette étude 
de cas, la capacité d’agir efficacement des comités dépend aussi de la 
manière dont ils seront capables de déboucher sur des résultats qui seraient 
le fruit d’une certaine coordination. Cela dépend aussi du contexte. On 
observe des différences significatives entre les syndicats, les institutions de 
relations du travail et la stratégie transfrontalière des entreprises. D’autres 
recherches devraient étudier ces différences et évaluer leur impact sur la 
nature des facteurs qui exercent une influence sur les pratiques des comités. 
Ceci implique que, d’une manière plus générale, des recherches futures sur 
les comités devront s’accompagner d’une étude de l’influence du sommet 
vers la base des institutions à l’échelle européenne et d’approches qui se 
préoccupent de l’impact des effets de la base vers le sommet. Il ressort de 
ce raisonnement qu’il faut apprécier dans quelle mesure la capacité des 
syndicats européens d’utiliser à l’avenir les comités comme instrument 
d’influence sur la prise de décision des entreprises découlera d’un produit 
intégré de ces forces en présence.
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